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Table 1 
 
REVERSAL RATES AFTER FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS BY JURY OR JUDGE 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988-97, DISTINGUISHED BY TYPE OF CASE  
Data Considered by Clermont and Eisenberg: Defendant/Plaintiff Differentials in 
Personal Injury Jury Trials and Non-Personal Injury Judge Trials 
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Hypothesis:  • Appellate judges favor defendant/appellants whenever they suspect a pro-plaintiff bias by trial courts. 
Assumptions:  • Appellate judges suspect trial courts of favoring “little victim” plaintiffs over “big” defendants. 
    • “Little victim” plaintiffs and “big” defendants are most often found in personal injury cases. 
      • Appellate courts suspect that juries, even more than judges, improperly favor plaintiffs. 
Offered Proof:    • The greatest differential between defendant and plaintiff appellate win rates is in personal injury 
                                trials and the smallest is in non-personal injury judge-trials. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Adapted from Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125, 140 (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
Table 2 
 
REVERSAL RATES AFTER FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS BY JURY OR JUDGE 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988-97, DISTINGUISHED BY TYPE OF CASE  
First Alternative Variable Not Considered by Clermont and Eisenberg: 
Plausible Effect of the General Difference in Nature of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Appeals 
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Hypothesis:  • If one side more often relies on viable legal claims and the other on factual arguments, the side relying on  
   viable legal claims will generally secure more reversals in most types of civil cases. 
Assumptions:  • Plaintiffs’ appellate claims often go to the weight of the evidence—a factual matter. 
   • Defendants more often rely on legal analysis. 
Offered Proof:    • In three of the four categories of cases studied, defendant/appellants are more likely to succeed than            
  plaintiff/appellants. 
______________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 
  Adapted from Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125, 140 (2000). 
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Table 3 
 
REVERSAL RATES AFTER FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS BY JURY OR JUDGE  
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988-97, DISTINGUISHED BY TYPE OF CASE  
Second Alternative Variable Not Considered by Clermont and Eisenberg: 
Plausible Effect of More Experienced Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
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Hypothesis: • The experience of appellate counsel may effect the likelihood of success on appeal. 
Assumptions:  • Plaintiffs’ appellate counsel in non-personal injury cases may tend to have more experience than plaintiffs’ 
  appellate counsel in personal injury cases. 
Offered Proof:  • Plaintiff/appellants have a greater chance of winning in non-personal injury trials than they do in personal  
   injury trials, regardless of whether the cases were tried by a jury or judge. 
________________________________________________________________ ______________________________ 
  Adapted from Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125, 140 (2000). 
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REVERSAL RATES AFTER FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS BY JURY OR JUDGE 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1988-97, DISTINGUISHED BY TYPE OF CASE  
Third Alternative Variable Not Considered by Clermont and Eisenberg:  
Plausible Combined Effect of Findings of Fact by Judges and More Experienced Counsel 
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Hypothesis:  • Judge verdicts (as compared to jury verdicts) increase the likelihood of reversals by plaintiff/appellants who have                 
  experienced counsel. 
Assumptions:  • It is easier for experienced plaintiffs’ counsel to provide appellate courts with good issues (especially issues involving the   
   burden of proof and factual matters) when the reasoning of the decision-maker is articulated. 
Offered Proof:  • In judge-tried cases, plaintiff/appellants win substantially more often in non-personal injury cases than in personal injury     
   cases (circled). 
    • Plaintiff/appellants win no more in judge-tried personal injury cases than in jury-tried personal injury cases (boxed).  
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Adapted from Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125, 140 (2000). 
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